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Abstract
This paper aims to introduce a forthcoming book titled The Eurozone Enlargement: 
Prospect of New EU Member States for the Euro Adoption, which is to be published in 2016. 
The book has been written by 5 economists from Eastern Europe and 3 economists from 
Japan. It considers the problems of the prospect of the Eurozone enlargement by reviewing 
the experiences of New EU Member States (NMS) which have adopted the Euro and 
considering prospects of NMS which have not yet adopted the Euro. The book discusses the 
following important issues: 1) Experiences of NMS which have already adopted Euro; 2) 
Attitude toward the entry in the EMU; 3) Problems concerning convergence; 4) 
Macroeconomic Stability; 5) Industrial Policy; 6) Loss of monetary autonomy; 7) Austerity 
measures. Many contributors emphasize the importance of necessity for accomplishment 
not only of the Maastricht criteria of nominal convergence but also of criteria of substantial 
and institutional convergence. Finally, the book argues that in order for non-Euro NMS to 
adopt the Euro it is dispensable for the European Commission to formulate a new strategy 
for the economic development in the EU periphery including NMS. In this regard, wisdom 
which should replace austerity measures is urgently required. Although not discussed 
directly, the book has important implication for Candidates in the Western Balkans.
Keywords
Euro, New EU Member States (NMS), Optimal Currency Area (OCA), Economic Monetary 
Union (EMU), Convergence
1. Introduction
Recently I have edited a book titled The Eurozone Enlargement: Prospect of New EU 
Member States for the Euro Adoption, which will be published in 2016. This book 1 considers 
* Correspondence to : KOYAMA Yoji 
 PhD Professor emeritus, Niigata University
 2-8050, Ikarashi, Nishi-ku, Niigata, 950-2181, Japan 
 E-mail: ZAC00343@nifty.com
98 『社会システム研究』（第 32 号）
the problems of the prospect of the Eurozone enlargement by reviewing the experiences of 
New EU Member States (NMS) which have adopted the Euro and considering prospects of 
NMS which have not yet adopted the Euro. So far, problems in the EU, for example crises 
in the Eurozone, etc., have been usually discussed taking into consideration core member 
states (EU 15). Such problems have seldom been discussed from the viewpoint of New EU 
member states (NMS) from CEE, or Candidates from the Western Balkan countries.  
In May 2004, 8 countries from CEE, i.e. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were admitted to the EU. In January 
2007 Romania and Bulgaria, and in July 2013 Croatia were admitted to the EU. Among 11 
NMS from CEE, 5 countries adopted the Euro one after another, first Slovenia (2007) 
followed by Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015). One of the 
important challenges facing NMS after EU accession is to join the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), i.e. adopt the Euro, after having satisfied the Maastricht convergence 
criteria. At present 6 out of 11 NMS from CEE have not adopted the Euro yet. They are not 
allowed the right to opt out as the UK and Denmark have had, and they are requested to 
eventually adopt the Euro. These countries have their own problems. This book also tries 
to clarify concretely their methods for Euro adoption by solving those problems.
This paper presents the essence of the book. This paper is structured as follows: 
Section 2 explains how the editor of the book views the Eurozone crisis. Section 3 presents 
important issues which have been discussed in the book. Section 4 describes some 
conclusions. 
2. How should we grasp the Eurozone Crisis?
The Greek crisis has been continuing since spring 2010. Almost nobody discusses the 
Eurozone enlargement when the Eurozone is in turmoil and Grexit (Greece’s exit from the 
Eurozone) is openly discussed. It may sound ridiculous to discuss the Eurozone 
enlargement at such a time. An optimistic view is not held for the current situation in the 
Eurozone. 
The root of the Eurozone crisis lies in the fact that the euro, a single common currency, 
was created with insufficient foundations to support it. In order to create a common 
currency and stabilize its value, convergence of the economies of prospective member 
states of the EMU has been considered necessary. The degree of convergence of these 
countries was measured mainly from the fiscal and monetary perspective. The Maastricht 
99Prospect of New EU Member States for the Euro Adoption（KOYAMA Yoji）
Treaty of 1992 prescribes the explicit criteria to be satisfied by prospective member states 
of the EMU as follows: 1) price stability, 2) budget (budgetary deficit less than 3% of GDP), 
3) public debt (accumulated national debt below 60% of GDP), 4) long-term interest rate, 5) 
fluctuation of exchange rate. In addition, these criteria have been reinforced by the 
Stabilization and Growth Pact (SGP) of 1997 which was concluded as a derivative of 
Germany’s strong request. The SGP sets the limit of budget deficits to be less than 3% of 
the GDP even after the adoption of the Euro.
The European Central Bank (ECB), which is the central bank for the Eurozone, has 
been located in Frankfurt am Main in Germany. It is a widespread belief that this decision 
was a compensation for Germany’s renunciation of the Deutsch Mark. The character of the 
ECB has inherited that of Germany’s Bundesbank and it is rather different from that of 
central banks in other countries. In the Anglo-French model, for example, the central bank 
pursues several objectives, i.e., price stability, fostering economic growth, maintenance of 
employment at a high level, financial stability, etc. Price stability is only one of its goals. 
This type of central banking is characterized by the subordination of the central bank to 
politics. In contrast, in the German model price stability is the primary objective of the 
central bank. ‘Employment at a high level’ is a secondary objective. Its political 
independence is of utmost importance (Paul de Grauwe, 2009). The economic thought 
underlying the German model is Ordo economics, which rejects discretional economic 
operations based on Keynesian economics and places importance on discipline. This 
standpoint and the German government’s attitude toward the Eurozone crisis are similar 
at a fundamental level.
Since intra-regional labor mobility has been insufficient and redistribution among 
member states through the budget has also been insufficient (although there has been 
transfer through the EU’s structural funds and cohesion fund, the amount has been small), 
the Eurozone is not an optimal currency area (OCA). Unlike the USA, the Eurozone 
started as a monetary union without a fiscal union 2. The endogeneity hypothesis of OCA 
theory emphasizes the positive relationship between monetary integration and economic 
convergence. According to this somewhat optimistic view, once a country enters a common-
currency area, even if it did not satisfy the criteria ex ante, eventually through economic 
integration such as improvements in intra-union trading relationships, the country can 
satisfy the criteria ex post. In contrast, however, the specialization hypothesis of OCA 
theory argues that trade integration will enhance the specialization of each country’s 
production since countries will tend to export more of those goods where they possess a 
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comparative advantage (Baimbridge and Whyman, 2015, pp. 64-65). It will take more time 
to be able to judge which is correct, but for the time being the specialization hypothesis 
seems the more convincing.
The EMU started in January 1999 and the Euro, a common currency, was created. 
Circulation of banknotes and coins of the Euro began in January 2002. The Euro had 
contained at least two problems: Firstly, the interest rate for the Eurozone is to be decided 
at around the average of interest rates among the Eurozone member states. This meant 
that the interest rate would be too high or too low for peripheral countries. In a country 
where the inflation rate is higher, the Eurozone real interest rate tends to be lower and 
even negative, which tends to cause a bubble. Secondly, as for government debt, in the past 
governments of Southern Europe had to issue government bonds with a high yield, but 
since joining the Eurozone the risk premium has decreased, so that they became able to 
issue government bonds with low yields – only slightly higher than the German 
government bonds. In reality, however, it was an illusion, but it allowed the governments of 
Southern Europe including Greece to depend easily on the bond issue. The period from the 
inception of the Eurozone to the 2008 global financial crisis, which Shultz calls the 
“honeymoon” period (Wolf, 2014), was a happy time for the Eurozone member states.
The EU member states were hit hard by the 2008 global financial crisis. The Greek 
crisis which surfaced in 2010 and the subsequent crisis in GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain) revealed substantial flaws in design and operation of the Eurozone. In 
Greece, general elections were held in autumn 2009 resulting in a change of government. 
The new prime minister suddenly announced that the general government budget deficit 
as a percentage of the GDP in 2009 was not 3.7% as the previous government had said but 
in fact 12.7% (I would like to add that also in 2001 when Greece joined the EMU, as was 
later revealed, the Greek government had met the criterion of budget deficit of less than 
3% of the GDP by utilizing statistical fraud). With this sudden announcement, concerns 
about Greek government’s ability to repay debts have increased in a moment. In Western 
Europe many banks possessed Greek government bonds and therefore a decrease in their 
value would expose these banks to serious damage. In spring 2010, when the time for 
redemption of government bonds came, the Greek crisis surfaced. In the same year, as a 
chain reaction, problems of budget deficit had become acute in Southern European 
countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy as well as Ireland. Prior to the 2008 global 
financial crisis it was only Greece that had an excessive budget deficit. In the case of other 
Southern European countries and Ireland, the fiscal conditions were not so dire. Their 
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fiscal stance worsened only after the bubble burst due to the global financial crisis. The 
sudden announcement by the new Greek government triggered the Eurozone crisis, but its 
real cause lies in the North-South problem, i.e., the inequality in competitiveness which 
has accumulated for 10 years since the creation of the Euro.
Statistical fraud by the Greek government was a dire mistake. There are other 
problems such as the government’s weak tax-collection ability, tax evasion by the high 
income group, an excessive number of public employees, an overly generous pension 
system, etc. These are surely problems to be overcome by drastic reforms. However, it is not 
only Greece that should shoulder all the blame. Since northern countries of the Eurozone 
including Germany actively lent money to Southern Europe out of superfluous money 
earned from their exports to Southern Europe, it would be natural for northern countries 
to be required to bear appropriate burdens in order to overcome the crisis in the Eurozone. 
It would be necessary for Greece to develop competitive manufacturing in the long run, but 
for the time being in order to avoid the collapse of the Eurozone, support for Greece by the 
North would be indispensable. The biggest hurdle is that the present Eurozone lacks any 
mechanism for the correction of disequilibria.
Leaders of the Eurozone often met and discussed serious problems of public debt in 
Southern Europe including Greece, but its supportive measures were taken little by little 
too late, and as a consequence aggravated the crisis. The Lisbon Treaty includes a “No 
Bailout Clause”, which forbids the rescue of a member state by any other member state (s) 
on the grounds that the rescue of a member state might pose a moral hazard. In practice, 
this clause prevented the member states from promptly responding to the crisis. In May 
2010, when the Greek crisis surfaced the Eurozone member states agreed on the 
establishment of the European Financial Stability Facilities (EFSF), which was a 
framework for supporting Greece and other member states in case they fell into funding 
difficulties. This was a temporary body until June 2013 when it was replaced by the 
European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM), which is deemed a European version of the 
IMF. 
Germany is the most influential member state in the Eurozone. Leaders of the 
Eurozone, German Chancellor Angela Merkel in particular, emphasized budgetary 
discipline and requested Greece to take rigorous austerity measures as a condition for 
support through the EFSF. Giving priority to a decrease in the budget deficit, Germany 
requested Greece to implement economic reforms including reduction in the number of 
public employees and reductions in the existing pension system, etc. These merciless 
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austerity measures have deprived the Greek economy of any remaining energy for 
activating the economy, causing a vicious circle of a decline in aggregate demand, a decline 
in the level of economic activity, an increase in the unemployment rate and again an 
expansion of the budget deficit. In Greece, the unemployment rate increased to 25% with it 
being 50% for young people, intensifying social unrest. An anti-austerity leftist party 
SYRIZA won the general election in January 2015. Alexis Tsipras, the new prime minister, 
negotiated with leaders of the Eurozone for the withdrawal of austerity measures, but 
their standpoint remained firm. A critical situation has emerged from the end of June 
through mid-July 2015 when the Greek government had not been able to repay borrowed 
money, which was due to the IMF at the end of June. In the course of negotiations a 
proposal of “Greek withdrawal from the Eurozone as a five-year temporary measure” was 
even posed by Germany. The Eurozone summit, which dragged on for 17 hours from July 
12 through 13, finally reached a “settlement without a winner”. In this way, Grexit was 
narrowly avoided for the time being, but a possibility of Grexit in the future cannot be 
completely excluded. Even if Greece withdraws from the Eurozone, the problems inherent 
in the Eurozone would remain. There is also a possibility that another member state from 
Southern Europe facing a serious crisis might be obliged to withdraw. As the Eurozone has 
structural problems it is deemed urgent that fundamental reforms be implemented.
If the EU takes a step forward toward fiscal federalism, where the European 
Commission has a more solid fiscal foundation and distributes funds among member 
states, it would imply great progress, but this remains quite difficult under the present 
circumstances. There are various opinions about the future of the Eurozone. Many 
pessimistic views are expressed 3. Among them, Brendan Brown points out that in addition 
to vital flaws in the design of the EMU the ECB made mistakes in its judgements of the 
situations and policy-makings for 10 years and proposes the establishment of a new 
monetary union (EMU-2) (Brown, 2012). Two British economists, Baimbridge and Whyman 
point out problems of the EMU and propose that monetary sovereignty is returned to each 
member state and that a European version of the international clearing union, which John 
Maynard Keynes proposed at the end of World War II, is established (Baimbridge and 
Whyman, 2015). Martin Wolf likens problems of the euro crisis to “unhappy marriage”. 
According to him, the possible outcomes are (1) divorce; (2) continuation of a bad marriage; 
or (3) creation of good marriage. Today the member states are dangling between the first 
two alternatives. The marriage is pretty bad, but divorce looks frighteningly painful. He 
proposes to turn this into a good marriage (Wolf, 2014, p. 292). At present, this proposal 
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seems to be the most practical.
3. Important Issues which have been discussed in the Book
This book 4 has reviewed the experiences of NMS which have adopted the euro and 
discussed the challenges facing non-euro NMS in their future euro adoption. Important 
issues which have been discussed in the Book can be summarized as follows:
1) Experiences of NMS which have already adopted the Euro
According to a Slovenian economist Joze Mencinger, for Slovenia, the changeover from 
the Dinar to the Tolar and from the Tolar to the Euro was an “emergency exit” from 
difficult situations. In this way, he appears to take the changeover of the currency from one 
to another rather coolly, but it seems that most Slovenian people were immersed in “EU-
phoria” 5 when the country joined the EU and the EMU. When the country was admitted to 
the EU in May 2004 it had already satisfied the Maastricht convergence criteria and 
adopted the euro in January 2007 earlier than any other NMS. In that sense this country 
was the best performer among NMS. In this country, however, the Euro adoption combined 
with a neoliberal course taken by the center-right coalition government caused a sudden 
increase in inflows of foreign capital, and a bubble economy. This small country with an 
open economy was hit hard by the reversal of international capital flow after the 2008 
global financial crisis. Although the economy picked up somewhat in 2010-2011, it fell into 
serious depression again in 2012 under a “double-dip” recession in the Eurozone.
In the case of Slovakia, for a while, prior to the EU accession (1997-1999), the country 
was classified as the second wave due to a delay in reforms in the country. Finally the 
distinction between the first and the second waves was removed and Slovakia became able 
to join the EU in 2004 together with other countries from CEE. Due to its bitter experience 
in 1997-1999, Slovakia actively chose its early entry into the EMU in order to get rid of its 
uneasiness of non-EMU membership and joined the EMU in 2009 (Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4). The automobile industry, in which foreign automobile producers invested during the 
period of the Dzurinda government, has been leading exports from this country, and 
therefore, the Slovak economy has been doing well, although its economic growth was 
interrupted for a while by the 2008 global financial crisis.
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2) Attitude toward the entry in the EMU
As Gabriela Dragan points out, Sweden fulfils all Maastricht criteria except for the 
exchange rate criterion. It seems that Sweden has deliberately not fulfilled the convergence 
criteria by not joining the ERM II, thereby postponing its entry into the Eurozone. The 
economic support for Greece through the EFSF was a considerable burden for the 
Eurozone member states. Many people expressed dissatisfaction over contributions to the 
EFSF. In Slovakia, for example, there was a complaint, “In spite of lower income, Slovakia 
would have to allocate a lot of money in support of a larger country’s support”. Finally the 
proposal by the government was accepted by the parliament in exchange for the Prime 
Minister’s resignation 6. The “threat of solidarity contributions for Greece” 7 is affecting the 
issue of the EMU entry by non-euro NMS. Probably, these countries are hesitating to enter 
into the Eurozone and for the time being are adopting a ‘wait and see strategy” following 
Sweden’s example (Chapter 9). Most of the non-euro NMS have not set their target dates 
for euro adoption. It is noteworthy that in such a situation Romania remains the only non-
euro member state which has formally set a target date for euro-adoption, which is 
January 1, 2019. As Dragan says, it might be used in public discourse toward reforms for 
its likely catalytic effect (Chapter 9). Vaclav Klaus, the former President of the Czech 
Republic was famous for Euroscepticism. During his term of office (2003-2013) he 
continued to oppose the Euro adoption and appointed Eurosceptic persons to the central 
Bank Board, the governing body of the Czech National Bank. Milos Zeman, who was 
elected as the President of the Republic in early 2013, supports the adoption of the Euro. 
The present government and ruling parties are taking a positive attitude toward the Euro 
adoption. It is likely that this country will adopt the Euro sometime after around 2020 
(Chapter 6). In such a situation, the standpoint of the present government of Hungary, 
which continues to take a negative attitude toward the Euro adoption, is conspicuous 
among NMS (Chapter 7). Turning our attention to countries outside NMS, the government 
of the UK intends to decrease its contribution to the EU budget and take part of the 
transferred power back from the EU. The possibility that in the future the EU will have 
two tracks cannot be excluded.
3) Problems concerning convergence
As Ryszard Rapacki, Gabriela Dragan and Hiroshi Tanaka point out, a nominal 
convergence is not enough for entry into the EMU. The Maastricht convergence criteria are 
called explicit criteria, and a convergence viewed from the angle of these criteria is called a 
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nominal convergence. Economic literature has made an important distinction between 
nominal convergence, assimilated with the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria, and real 
convergence. Real convergence is usually understood as the convergence of real variables, 
such as GDP per capita, and in a broader sense, as the fulfilment of optimum currency area 
criteria, such as trade openness or labor productivity (Chapter 9). In addition, there is 
institutional convergence. Both real and institutional convergences are called implicit 
convergences. Rapacki, Dragan and Tanaka stress the necessity for real convergence and 
institutional convergence. Let me quote two important tables from Chapter 5. From Table 
1 we can find that Poland as well as the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania satisfy all 
nominal convergence criteria except for the exchange rate because these countries have 
not joined the ERM II yet (according to Rapacki, Poland came to satisfy the criterion of 
general government balance in 2015). From Table 2 we can find that non-Euro NMS except 
for the Czech Republic have not reached two thirds of the EMU average of GDP per capita 
in PPS as of 2014. It means that for them there is a big gap to be narrowed in terms of real 
convergence. 
Table 1. Fulfilment of the nominal convergence criteria in the prospective EMU members from Central and 
Eastern Europe (data as of 2014)
Country Inflation
General 
government 
balance
Public debt
Interest 
ratesa
Exchange 
rate
Reference value 
0.4%c 
1.6%d
–3.0 60.0
7.4%c 
6.1%d
+/– 15%
Poland 0.1 –3.2 50.1 3.5 5.2
Bulgaria –1.6 –2.8 27.6 3.4 ..
Croatia 0.2 –5.7 85.0 4.0 ..
Czech Republic 0.4 –2.0 42.6 1.6 10.8b
Hungary 0.0 –2.6 76.9 4.8 8.3b
Lithuania* 1.2 –2.6 39.0 3.8 0.0b
Romania 1.4 –1.5 39.8 4.5 ..
a - bond yields (annual data), b - 2005; c - including deflation countries; d - excluding deflation countries.
* - joined the EMU on 1 January 2015.
Source: Rapacki (2016), Chapter 5 of Koyama (ed.) (2016).  
Original Source:  Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; Rapacki R., Matkowski Z., Próchniak M., Transition 
Countries: Economic Situation and the Progress of Market Reforms, “World Economy 
Research Institute Working Papers”, No. 324, Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw 2015; 
own calculations.
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Table 2. Real convergence in CEE11 countries vis-à-vis the EMU average, 1989-2014  
(GDP per capita in PPS, EMUa = 100)
Country 1989b 2004 2012 2013 2014
Non-EMU members
Poland 38 45 61 63 64
Bulgaria 47 31 41 42 42
Croatia 51 52 56 57 55
Czech Republic 75 72 76 77 79
Hungary 56 57 60 62 63
Lithuania 55 46 64 68 69
Romania 34 31 49 50 50
Averagec 51 48 58 60 60
EMU members
Estonia 54 50 66 68 68
Latvia 52 44 56 60 60
Slovakia 59 52 69 70 71
Slovenia 74 79 76 77 78
Averagec 60 56 67 69 69
a - EMU18 excluding Lithuania who joined the EMU on 1 January 20015. 
b - the benchmark = EU15 average.
c - non-weighted arithmetic average.
Source: Rapacki (2016), Chapter 5 of Koyama (ed.) (2016).
Original Source:   IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2005 (for 1989); Eurostat (ec.europa.eu/
eurostat) (for 2004-2014); own calculations.
Dragan argues that the Maastricht convergence criteria are necessary conditions but 
not sufficient conditions for entry into the EMU, which requires real convergence. 
According to her, there were expectations that if a country entered, then a convergence and 
catching-up would emerge, but they are not automatic results of the EU accession. She 
argues that the long-term sustainability of the Eurozone will strongly depend not only on 
the respect of new fiscal rules or stronger coordination of economic policies, but particularly 
on the EU’s capacity to reduce its internal economic divergence (Chapter 9). When Rapacki 
considers a successful participation in a common currency area by a newcomer country, the 
main parts of the reference framework are firstly, the optimal currency area theory and 
secondly, new institutional economics and political economy with special emphasis on the 
“diversity of capitalism” (DoC) approach and “variety of capitalism” (VoC) concept. The 
approach which puts emphasis on institutional aspects is deemed useful when we consider 
the problems of the Eurozone enlargement. According to Rapacki, Poland meets all of 5 
criteria for nominal convergence but does not meet ex ante all implicit criteria of the EMU 
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membership, as spelled out by the OCA theory, even though the country has made 
remarkable progress in real and institutional convergence. Therefore, it will take some 
time for this country to join the EMU. He says the decision on the Euro adoption in Poland 
remains strictly political (Chapter 5). This point also applies to other non-Euro NMS.
4) Macroeconomic Stability
Dragan argues that macroeconomic stability should be considered a prerequisite 
rather than a final goal in the convergence process (Chapter 9). The EU had already 
advocated free mobility of capital before the emergence of a single market in the EU in the 
early 1990s. In response to the birth of the single currency that is the Euro, competition 
among major West European banks had intensified, and these banks advanced to post-
socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Thus cross-border bank 
ownership in CEE emerged from the end of the 1990s to the early 21st century, resulting 
in a decrease in interest rates. Subsidiaries and branches of West European major banks 
actively gave loans to firms and households in CEE, competing against other banking 
groups for market shares. Such excessive lending resulted in bubbles in these countries, 
making their economies very vulnerable to external shocks. The direction of cross-border 
capital flow has been reversed since the 2008 global financial crisis, severely damaging 
these countries 8. Generally speaking, the European Commission, the ECB and central 
banks in EU member states were not alert to the bubbles at that time. The banking 
supervision system was not well-developed. There was a principle, according to which 
home countries’ monetary authorities were responsible for their own countries’ banks, but 
they could not sufficiently regulate activities of branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks 
in host countries. Later, from 2011 through 2013 the EU established the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure, the Excessive Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and the European Semester 
(Chapter 9). Hence, policies taken at present for avoiding a recurrence of the crisis are 
reinforced by fiscal discipline and monitoring and cooperation in terms of macroeconomic 
policies, which involve the imposition of penalties for any violations. This is a reform 
toward what Tanaka calls “Union of Numerical Targets and Sanctions” (Chapter 4). It is 
yet to be seen whether it will succeed, or not.
5) Industrial Policy
Koyama argues, for Croatia, which has had an industrial structure quite similar to 
that of Greece, the active use of industrial policy is desirable in order to upgrade its 
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industrial structure (Chapter 8). In addition to the EU’s own funds (Structural Funds and 
Cohesion Fund), it is necessary for the EU to take the necessary measures to induce 
private funds to be invested into this country. This point also applies to NMS in less 
developed South Eastern Europe, i.e. Romania and Bulgaria. According to Dragan, in order 
to ensure the real conversion with the Eurozone, Romania is required to make more efforts 
in the fields of employment, education and research, and at the same time, improvement in 
infrastructure, and the enhancement of administrative ability, etc., will be needed. Support 
from the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund of the EU is crucial for less developed 
EU member states. At present the absorption rate of EU funds is low in Romania, therefore 
it is necessary to increase this rate (Chapter 9). Michal Mejstrik considers that a 
characteristic feature of quickly transforming post-Communist economies in their 
transition to a market economy is what Schumpeter called “creative destruction”. 
According to Mejstrik, the existing export success of the Czech Republic was benefiting 
particularly from two key factors – from the maximum utilization of a favorable 
geographical position of the country (located in Central Europe and adjacent to Germany) 
and from the relatively cheap, but qualified labor force. However, he is not optimistic about 
the future of the country. The wages are increasing and real unit costs of the labor force in 
the country are rising, which results in the decreasing of the price competitiveness of the 
country and its comparative advantage in the European market. He singles out non-price 
competitiveness and stresses the importance of the international competitiveness strategy 
drawn up by the government (Chapter 6).
6) Loss of monetary autonomy 
By joining the EMU, i.e. the Eurozone, NMS lose adequate space for their own 
monetary policies. More exactly speaking, EU member states lose monetary autonomy 
when they join the ERM II. Mentioning this point, Mencinger argues: “By entering the EU 
in May 2004 and the ERM II in June 2004, Slovenia also formally lost its monetary 
autonomy. The Bank of Slovenia ceased to independently implement monetary policy on 
December 31st, 2006 [the day before the adoption of the Euro] and began implementing 
the single monetary policy of the Euro-system. In a decade and a half, a newly born 
national economy turned again to a regional economy”. However, “the loss of monetary 
autonomy” is taken in various ways depending on the people and countries. According to 
Vanya Ivanova, for example, Bulgaria has already lost its monetary autonomy since 1997 
when the country adopted the currency board regime, and the only instrument of state 
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influence on the economy since that time has been the state budget. Even if the country 
joined the EMU, such a situation would remain unchanged. Rather, by joining the EMU 
the Bulgarian central bank (BNB) will be able to carry out open market operations and to 
extend loans to the commercial banks (without the formal restrictions imposed by the 
currency board) and will get full access to the EU financial assistance mechanisms, such as 
the ESB and emergency liquidity assistance for financial institutions. In addition, she 
claims that once the BNB participates in the determining of the monetary policy within 
the Eurozone, it will actually have a greater influence on the Bulgarian monetary 
environment than that at present. Bulgaria’s position is similar to that of the Baltic States 
which had been incorporated into the Soviet Union for about a half century, and regained 
their independence only in September 1991. In addition, Lithuania also had the currency 
board regime until its entry into the EMU. It seems that these countries willingly entered 
the economic area of the EU by placing more emphasis on a complete withdrawal from the 
economic area of Russia rather than the loss of monetary autonomy by their entry into the 
EMU.
7) Austerity measures
This issue is not treated directly in this book, but is continuously referred to 
throughout the entire book. Facing a sovereign debt crisis, the EU, Germany in particular, 
have been promoting austerity measures which have brought deflation to the periphery of 
the EU. The danger of austerity measures is well explained by Mark Blyth (2013): “the 
current mess is not a sovereign debt crisis generated by excessive spending for anyone 
except Greeks. … .What actually happened in Europe was that over the decade of the 
introduction of the Euro, very large core-country European banks bought lots of peripheral 
sovereign debt and levered up far more than their American cousins” (Blyth, 2013, pp. 5-6). 
As many banks fell into difficulties due to the global financial crisis, governments were 
obliged to bail out, recapitalize, and add liquidity to the banking system, resulting in the 
sovereign debt crisis. What happened first was a banking crisis. According to Walter 
Paternesi Meloni (2015), the European Commission recommended deficit countries to 
implement structural reforms on the grounds that current account differentials were 
almost exclusively referred to their weak price competitiveness. He explains the logic 
underlying austerity measures which have been imposed on peripheral countries: Firstly, 
in order to restore government debt sustainability - the reducing of the debt-to-GDP ratio, 
mitigating market losses of trust and lowering of risk premiums (expansionary austerity); 
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secondly, in order to restore external competitiveness through internal devaluation - real 
wage reduction and structural reforms (competitive austerity). This is the neoliberal view 
placing an emphasis on the supply side. As a matter of fact, an improvement in current 
account occurred not through these channels, but through a channel of a decrease in 
aggregate demand, leading to a decrease in total output, and a decrease in consumption 
and a decrease in imports. In this way, this policy has brought debt deflation. Paternesi 
Meloni disproves the austerity – competitiveness linkage and, based on Keynesian 
economics, argues the necessity for putting an emphasis on the demand side. In this regard 
Paul de Grauwe (2013) argues that debtor countries in the periphery almost exclusively 
bear the burden of adjustment in the imbalances in the Eurozone and that since both the 
debtor and the creditor nations were responsible for the crisis, they could share the cost of 
adjustment. When the Greek crisis recurred from June through July 2015, the German 
government responded rigidly, rejecting a request for the writing-off of Greece’s debt. In 
the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 the IMF responded arrogantly to countries 
which fell into crisis. It is ironical that the IMF proposes debt reduction for Greece, 
showing a more flexible attitude than the European Commission and the German 
government 9. A drastic policy change in this respect will be one of the keys for the EU’s 
development. 
4. Conclusion
As Mejestrik’s expression the “threat of solidarity contributions for Greece” explains 
the current situation well, the Eurozone crisis starting from the Greek crisis has been 
seriously affecting the Eurozone enlargement. Dragan says, “The Greek crisis has 
demonstrated that the admittance of an unprepared country would not be the correct 
solution either for the acceding country or for the admitting club”, and she emphasizes the 
importance of necessity for accomplishment of real convergence criteria. Also many other 
authors emphasize the importance of necessity for accomplishment not only of Maastricht 
criteria of nominal convergence but also of criteria of substantial and institutional 
convergence. The Czech Republic is in a position very close to the EMU membership in 
terms of nominal and real convergence. However, Vaclav Klaus, the former President of the 
Republic, was a famous for Euroscepticism, and the Czech government continued to take a 
negative attitude toward the Euro. It is noteworthy that with the appearance of a pro-Euro 
new President of the Republic in 2013 the government and monetary authorities are 
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taking a positive attitude toward the Euro. However, if this country adopts the Euro it is 
most likely that the Euro will be adopted after around 2020. I think that in order for non-
Euro NMS to adopt the Euro it is dispensable for the European Commission to formulate a 
new strategy for the economic development in the EU periphery including NMS. In this 
regard, wisdom which should replace austerity measures is urgently required. Without 
this, the Euro adoption by non-euro NMS will not make substantial progress.
Although Western Balkan countries are not discussed directly, this book has important 
implications for them. Facing the Greek crisis, for the present the EU is not enthusiastic 
about enlargement. The European Council in Brussels in March 2003 states, “The future of 
the Western Balkans is within the EU” (European Commission, 2003a). Also the European 
Commission states that the unification of Europe will not be completed until these 
countries join the European Union (European Commission, 2003b). The Western Balkans 
is as it were “a backyard” for the EU, and if the region is left in a state of being poor, it 
would remain a hotbed of organized crime and a route for drug smuggling and human 
trafficking, threatening the stability of the EU itself. Therefore, for mainly political reasons 
the EU will be obliged to deal with the Western Balkans’ European integration. Candidates 
in the Western Balkans such as Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
and Albania will join the EU sequentially most probably from around 2020 to around 2025 
(Perhaps, the EU enlargement will end with this). If these countries are admitted to the 
EU successfully, then the next challenges for them would be the adoption of the Euro after 
having fulfilled the Maastricht nominal convergence criteria and substantial convergence 
criteria. These countries will eventually face similar challenges to those NMS, which have 
not yet adopted but are expected to adopt the Euro, are facing now. 
Notes
1 I would like to explain how this book came to be published. The 9th World Congress of 
ICCEES (International Council for Central and East European Studies) was held at 
Makuhari (Japan) in early August 2015. Prior to that, I had an idea to organize a session 
titled “Eurozone Enlargement: Prospect of New EU Member States for Euro Adoption” for 
this Congress. After obtaining approval from Professor Ryszard Rapacki (Poland), Professor 
Michal Mejstrik (the Czech Republic) and Professor Hiroshi Tanaka (Japan), I proposed 
this session in June 2014 and it was adopted by the Program Committee of the Congress. 
Later, in January 2015 unexpectedly I received an offer to publish a book from US 
publisher Nova Science. I then developed my idea into the publication of a book in which - 
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in addition to the above-mentioned members - four other contributors from Romania, 
Bulgaria, Slovenia and Japan would be included. In that sense, this book is a product of 
international academic cooperation between Europe and Asia. 
2 In the case of the USA, after the formation of the fiscal union, the monetary union was 
formed. Rosefielde (2015) says that if a fiscal union is formed in the EU in the future, it 
will follow an order opposite to the US case. De Grauwe (2011) says that the Eurozone is a 
fragile system because a political union is not imbedded.
3 As far as I have read, the most critical toward the Euro is Emanuel Todd (2015), who is 
unsympathetic to it, saying that the Euro is a lame duck in the free trade regime. 
4 The contents of the book is as follows: Preface (Yoji Koyama); Chapter 1 Current Financial 
Situations and the EMU Evolution (Yusuke Matsuzawa); Chapter 2 From Dinar to Tolar 
and from Tolar to Euro: the Slovenian Experience (Joze Mencinger); Chapter 3 Slovakia: 
Its Adoption of the Euro and After (Yusuke Matsuzawa); Chapter 4 Some Lessons from the 
Successful Euro Adoption by the two CEE states (Hiroshi Tanaka); Chapter 5 The 
Institutional Underpinning of the Prospective Euro Adoption in Poland (Ryszard Rapacki); 
Chapter 6 The Czech Republic – The Present Situation of Prospective Eurozone Member: 
Current Challenges during the Time of Creative Destruction (Michal Mejstrik); Chapter 7 
Hungary’s Divergent Way to adopt the Euro (Hiroshi Tanaka); Chapter 8 Croatia’s 
Challenges regarding the Euro Adoption (Yoji Koyama); Chapter 9 Euro Adoption in 
Romania: Moving Faster or Moving Slower? (Gabriela Dragan); Chapter 10 Euro Adoption 
in Bulgaria: Opportunities and Challenges (Vanya Ivanova); Chapter 11 Conclusion (Yoji 
Koyama).
5 This expression is taken from the title of Rahman (2008).
6 Asahi Shimbun, October 12 and 13, 2011.
7 Professor Mejstrik’s power point presented at the 9th World Congress of ICCEES, held in 
Makuhari on August 6, 2015. This is a summarized expression of the following description 
written by himself in Conclusion of Chapter 6 in Yoji Koyama (ed.) (2016): “The discussion 
on euro adoption has been affected by the recent discussion on how to implement EU loan 
programs for Greece, including the use of the silent EFSM guaranteed by all EU members. 
This has reopened the issue of exposure and the collateral requirements for refinancing 
credit, as the smaller eurozone countries might be significantly exposed although their 
living standard (including that of Slovakia) is lower than the standard being subsidized in 
Greece”. Professor Mejstrik’s reply by an e-mail to my inquiry (January 17, 2016).  
8 After having finished writing our book (Koyama, ed. 2016), I read Radosevic and Cvijanovic 
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(2015). This book analyzes the financial crisis in South-Eastern European countries with 
“financialisation” as a keyword. In their book “financialisation” denotes “the increasing role 
of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies”, based on the definition by Epstein 
(2005) (Radosevic and Cvijanovic, 2015, p. 9). The editors of the book explain 
“financialisation” in a shortened way as follows: “the predominance of finance over real 
sector of an economy” (Ibid, p. 13). Financialisation started around 1980, and the 
fundamental cause of the 2007/8 global financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crisis 
should be viewed in the context of financialisation. The editors stress that the South-
Eastern European economies need rebalancing of their growth model in the post-crisis 
situations, as well as some sort of definancialisation strategies (Ibid, p. 14).
9 On July 2, 2015 IMF published its Debt Sustainability Analysis (IMF, 2015), saying that in 
order to make Greece’s debt sustainable a substantial reduction of the debt and an 
extension of its repayment period would be necessary. Takemori (2015) explains the 
difference in the approach to the Greek debt problem among the Troika (the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and IMF) (pp. 40-43). In his long postscript of the 
Japanese edition, which was written in August 2014, Blyth explains IMF’s conflicting 
relation with the European Commission and the ECB in recent years (pp. 362-363). 
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